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The Japanese Business Federation’s
Influence on Energy Policy Reform:
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster
By Bridget Cho*
This note focuses on the series of events that were pertinent to the Fukushima
Daichii Nuclear Disaster (“Fukushima”) and recommends stringent nuclear power
plant license procedures, stronger reform in accident mitigation policies, and
heightened transparency between the government and its people. Japan embraces
the peaceful use of nuclear technology to provide a substantial portion of its
electricity despite being the only country to have suffered the devastating effects of
nuclear weapons in wartime. The country has faced many difficulties in its energy
policy following the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2010, triggering
the Fukushima disaster. Japan’s government has implemented new safety
measures for nuclear power plants due to the international and domestic outcry for
safety.
Keidanren, also known as the Japan Business Federation, is an economic
organization comprised of 1,239 representative Japanese companies, 109
nationwide industrial associations, and 47 regional economic organizations.1 As
an economic organization, Keidanren supports corporate activities, including
nuclear energy and technology. Keidanren plays a significant role in the
continuous use of nuclear energy and technology because it directly encourages the
Japanese government to promote legislation and to create the conditions required
for its continued utilization.2
Taking into account the lessons learned from Fukushima, Keidanren and the
Japanese government have been working to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions
through bottom-up initiatives such as emissions trading schemes and information

* J.D. Candidate, UC Hastings College of the Law; B.A., English and Government, Smith
College. I thank the editors of the Hastings Business Law Journal for their hard work and for the
opportunity to present my thoughts in this note. I would also like to thank my uncle, Roger Shorack,
for his inspiration and guidance throughout my life.
1. About Keidanren, KEIDANREN, (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/pro
001.html.
2.
A Proposal for Near-Term Energy Policy, KEIDANREN, (Oct. 25, 2016). https://www.keidan
ren.or.jp/en/policy/2014/081.html#s2.
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sharing on energy-saving and low-carbon technologies among companies. The
Japanese government created an independent agency, the Nuclear Regulation
Authority (“NRA”), to ensure the separation from nuclear regulation and nuclear
development against the backdrop of a damaged public trust.3 The NRA enhanced
strict nuclear regulations in three areas4 and established a higher level of
transparency between the government and its people. These initiatives have
spurred contentious political battles for both nuclear development and nuclear
regulation.
This Article will discuss Keidanren’s initiatives on energy and climate
change policy, with reference to the Japanese Legal System and regulatory
agencies. This Article will also discuss how the evolving structure of the Japanese
economy has led to a change in the pattern of the business sector’s engagement
with energy policy-making and the specific roles of energy-intensive users after
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster.

I. BACKGROUND
a. Keidanren and Its Mission
As an economic organization, Keidanren supports corporate activities,
which contribute to the self-sustaining development of the Japanese
economy and the improvement in the quality of life for the Japanese
people.5 Keidanren is actively involved in the Japanese government’s
policy agenda and keeps close contacts with a wide range of stakeholders
including political leaders, administrators, and labor unions.6 Keidanren
also strives for the resolution of international issues and the development of
closer economic relations with various countries through policy dialogue
with the government and economic associations of each country.7
In the past, and particularly after Fukushima, the people criticized the
Japanese government for its lack of division between nuclear regulation
and nuclear development. For example, Keidanren submits formal
recommendations or proposals to relevant ministries or agencies to identify
problems and suggest solutions. This includes, among many others, a
formal proposal regarding Keidanren’s stance for tax reform in 2014 for
energy and business industries.8 The formal recommendations are
3.
Nuclear Regulation Authority, Japan, NUCLEAR REGULATION AUTHORITY, 1, 2 (Oct. 28,
2016) http s://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/nsr_leaflet_English.pdf.
4.
Id. at 4.
5.
About Keidanren, KEIDANREN, (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/profile/pro
001.html.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Keidanren’s Proposal Concerning FY 2014 Tax Reform, KEIDANREN, (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/2013/077.html and A Proposal for Near-Term Energy Policy,
supra note 1.
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incorporated in national meetings, whereby the recommendations are
implemented into the regulatory transcript. Given Keidanren’s importance
as a political pressure group through direct negotiations with relevant
ministries and cooperation with politicians, it is likely that Keidanren
continues to influence energy policy in Japan.
Keidanren also initiated the move toward improving administrative
transparency, secured new safety criteria founded on scientific grounds,
and endorsed the government’s regulatory plans of the “new regulatory
body to be established.”9 Keidanren wanted to support the growth of
nuclear energy, but without regulations, the government and its people
seemed skeptical particularly after the Fukushima Disaster. Consequently,
the Japanese government developed the NRA, an agency separate from the
Japanese Cabinet and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry
(“METI”).10 This is one of many instances where Keidanren’s requests
concerning the improvement in standards and certification systems are
incorporated into Japan’s nuclear regulating guidelines.
Before Fukushima, allegations that the then governing body, the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (“NISA”), repeatedly tried to
influence public symposiums on the use of nuclear energy proliferated
public media.11 These allegations came after business leaders of the
electric power company, Chubu, confessed to publicly delivering prearranged answers in favor of nuclear power during a news conference.12
Consequently, the public became skeptical of the authority overseeing
NISA, questioning whether other major energy corporations might be
involved in similarly dubious conduct.13 Encouraged by both the public
and Keidanren, the Japanese Cabinet formed the NRA to gain the public’s
trust and to create rigorous and reliable regulations of nuclear activities,14
to ensure transparency, and to appropriate information disclosure on
regulations.15
Even after establishing the NRA, the Japanese people criticized NISA
for its lack of independence and its too-close-for-comfort relationship
between the regulators and the industry.16 NISA was also criticized for

9.
Keidanren’s Views on the “Option for Energy and the Environment,” KEIDANREN, (Oct. 25,
2016), https://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/2012/057.html.
10. Nuclear Regulation Authority, Japan supra note 2, at 3 (see chart).
11. Nuclear Safety Agency Under Fire Over Fake Question, JAPAN TODAY (July 31, 2011),
http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/nuclear-safety-agency-under-fire-over-fake-questio
ns-at-symposiums.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. NRA’s Core Values and Principles, Nuclear Regulation Authority, (Oct. 25, 2016), https:
//www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/idea.html.
15. NRA’s Core Values and Principles, supra note 14.
16. Emily Benz, Lessons From Fukushima: Strengthening The International Regulation of
Nuclear Energy, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L & POL’Y REV. 845, 846–48 (2013).
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having a conflict of interest because it was part of METI, the branch
responsible for promoting nuclear power. In response, the Japanese
Cabinet decided to separate the NISA from the METI because the ministry
was too involved with promoting nuclear energy.17 To ensure conformity
and neutrality, the new task force functions directly under the Ministry of
Environment.18

A. WALK THROUGH TIME: JAPAN’S ENERGY POLICY HISTORY
Japan’s shortage of minerals and energy influenced its energy policy
development in the past century. Over 90% of Japan’s energy needs were satisfied
through import.
Specifically, during the critical reconstruction critical
reconstruction of the Japanese economy post World War II in the mid-20th
century, the country relied heavily on fossil fuel imports from the Middle East.19
To minimize dependency on foreign resources and to establish a competitive
economic market, Japan launched its first nuclear program in 1954,20 followed by
the inauguration of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1956 to promote nuclear
power development and utilization.21 The first reactor to produce electricity in
Japan was a prototype boiling water reactor: the Japan Power Demonstration
Reactor, which ran from 1963 to 1976 and provided a large amount of information
for later commercial reactors.22 Consequently, the re-evaluation of domestic
energy policy resulted in diversification and in particular, a major nuclear
construction program.
Similarly, changes in the United Kingdom (“UK”) and its economy over the
past century have effect the level of UK businesses participation in defining energy
policy. For example, in as early as the late 18th century, British companies
focused industrial luxuries including: tea, coffee, tobacco, sugar,23 whereas now,
those same companies have shifted their enterprise and services towards banking,
retail, and other service departments of the economy. During the mid-20th
century, the UK saw the birth of modern environmentalism and the development of
a public environmental consciousness, which consequently resulted in a

17. Nuclear Regulation Authority, Japan supra note 2, at 3 (see chart).
18. Id.
19. Nuclear Power in Japan, “Japan’s energy situation and international dependence”, WORLD
NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/countryprofiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx.
20. Nuclear Power in Japan, “Development of nuclear program & policy 1950 to 2000”,
WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/
country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Industrial Revolution, ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Industrial_Revo
lution.aspx.
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transformative and comprehensive body of environmental laws.24 On the other
hand, Japan prioritized reducing the country’s dependence on oil imports, which
meant the island country still relied on domestic corporations. This reliance began
a long partnership between the government and Keidanren in developing energy
policy.

CRITICAL EVENTS PRECEDING
DISASTER

THE

FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR

Japan’s energy policies, mainly the Act on Compensation for Nuclear
Damage25 (“Act”), amended in 2009, and Japan’s Law on Contract for Liability
Insurance for Nuclear Damage, were tested on March 11, 2011, when a powerful
earthquake and devastating tsunami struck Northeastern Japan including the
Miyagi, Fukushima, Iwate, Yamagata, Ibaraki, Chiba, Akita, and Aomori
prefectures. The Act states the nuclear operator is held liable regardless of fault
and describes the operator’s strict liability, which includes damage not covered by
the insurance contract and the indemnity fee to the government.26
The Act was amended in accordance with existing energy policy principles
and obliged the Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc. (“TEPCO”), a member of
Keidanren, to provide private insurance at an estimated 120 billion Japanese Yen
(“JPY”), per site, in the event of nuclear accidents.27 TEPCO hosted six boiling
water reactors at Fukushima Daiichi, where three were shut down for
maintenance.28 The maintenance of the reactors will be discussed later in this note.
Under the Act, TEPCO was strictly and exclusively liable for nuclear damage
defined as:
[N]uclear damage means any damage caused by the effects of the
fission process of nuclear fuel, or of the radiation from nuclear fuel
etc., or of the toxic nature of such materials, which means effects
that give rise to toxicity or its secondary effects on the human body
by ingesting or inhaling such materials.29

24. Ben Christman, A brief history of environmental law in the UK, ACADEMIA, (Oct. 25, 2016),
http://www.academia.edu/6679685/A_Brief_History_of_Environmental_Law_in_the_UK.
25. Key Provisions of Japanese Legislation Covering Liability for Nuclear Damages, Act No.
147 of 1961 as amended by Act No. 19 of 17 Apr. 2009, MARSH (Oct. 25, 2016), http://marsh.com/
DisasterRecovery/Content/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3880/Key-Provisions-of-Japanese-Legisla
tion-Covering-Liability-for-Nuclear-Damages.aspx.
26. Key Provisions of Japanese Legislation Covering Liability for Nuclear Damages, Order for
the Execution of the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (Act No. 45
of 1962, as amended 17 Apr. 2009), MARSH (Oct. 25, 2016), http://marsh.com/DisasterRecovery/
Content/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/3880/Key-Provisions-of-Japanese-Legislation-Covering-Liab
ility-for-Nuclear-Damages.aspx.
27. Ximena Vasquez, TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Accident Nuclear Liability Related Issues,
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 9-11, 9 (2011).
28. Benz supra note 16, at 846.
29. Act No. 147 of 1961 as amended by Act No. 19 of 17 Apr. 2009 supra note 25.
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The Japanese courts, however, did not stipulate to practical details and rules for
applying compensation. In the process of amending the Act, the Japanese
legislature and the agency in charge at the time, did not open the door to the public.
Rather, the government agencies invited members of Keidanren, specifically
representatives from the power sector30 because the representatives were closely
connected with public officials in charge of energy regulation. This is one of the
many deficiencies in energy and nuclear policies that can be attributed in one way
or another to Keidanren. Keidanren had a direct and crucial role in amending the
Act and the operators’ liability in the event of an accident. To cover the Japanese
civilians who suffered directly and indirectly from Fukushima, the 120 billion JPY
was not near enough.
A volume of private litigation against TEPCO ensued after Fukushima on
March 11, 2011.31 Japan’s Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damages did not
accurately calculate the financial resources needed for a large-scale disaster nor did
the Act identify the victims who could seek compensation.32 Section 16 of the Act
on Compensation for Nuclear Damages even states that the Japanese government
may assist in compensation claims if they exceed the operator’s liability, subject to
the Japanese Cabinet’s approval.33 Here, TEPCO was the power plant operator of
Fukushima Daiichi and the Japanese Cabinet approved in the compensation claims,
which led to controversy for TEPCO claimed it was a “natural disaster” and
therefore had no liability.34 TEPCO’s liability indemnified the Japanese
government through an indemnity contract between the government and TEPCO.35
This led the public to believe that Keidanren had too much influence in politics,
enough for the government to take over financial liability. Regardless of the Act
on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the aftermath of the disaster still remains
an unresolved mess of criminal negligence claims and unpaid compensation to
displaced victims unable to return to their homes.
The victims’ main critique thus suggests that TEPCO’s survival is due to the
power of Keidanren, and that Keidanren is believed to have more control of the
nuclear regulations than the Japanese government, causing large public distrust.
This distrust is largely because of no transparency among the people, Keidanren,
and the Japanese legislature. Without any information regarding energy policy and
related regulation issues, the Japanese people remain highly skeptical of the
government’s work.

30. Andrew DeWitt & Iida Tetsunari, The Power Elite and Environmental- Energy Policy in
Japan, 9 THE ASIA PAC. J. 1, 12 http://apjjf.org/2011/9/4/Andrew-DeWit/3479/article.html.
31. David McNeill, The Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Fight for Compensation, 10 THE
ASIA PAC. J. 1, 1 (2012) (discussing 7,600 completed forms TEPCO received for compensation postFukushima and the systemic issues associated with compensation).
32. Eric A. Feldman, Fukushima: Catastrophe, Compensation, and Justice in Japan, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 341–42 (2013).
33. Id. at 343.
34. Id. at 342–43.
35. Id.
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b. Japan’s Reformed Energy Policy
After Fukushima, TEPCO was seemingly stripped away of any
responsibilities in its hopes of a potential exoneration due to the “exceptional”
character of this disaster36. The Fukushima victims, left without adequate
compensation, urged for stricter nuclear regulation including removal of financial
liability caps to protect victims and urge Fukushima to take financial
responsibility. Proponents for stricter liability policies contend that the Japanese
Government, particularly the Dispute Reconciliation Committee appointed to
resolve the Fukushima issue, did not sufficiently provide the requisite assistance
for the victims’ recovery because the committee focused on claims to include only
government-designated victims of the disaster37 and accepted the government’s
controversial recommendations that “livable” radiation levels may be up to 20
millisieverts per year38 — revealing the shortcomings of this committee and
ultimately the influence from Keidanren.
According to data collected shortly after Fukushima, nuclear energy
accounted for almost 30% of the country’s total electricity production.39 The
Cabinet included plans to increase this to 41% by 2017 and 50% by 2030.40
Preliminary energy consumption figures indicate that in 2014 Japan generated
energy from coal, gas, oil, hydro, and relatively nothing from nuclear.41 The
country’s nuclear capacity was progressively shut down following the 2011
Fukushima accident. Thus, Japan focused most of its attention to renewables
including: solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass and waste and overall
consumption dropped from 2011 to the beginning of 2013 post Fukushima disaster
and without the contribution of nuclear energy.
In April 2015, the Japanese legislature announced that it wanted base-load
sources to return to providing 60% of the power by 2030, with about one-third of
this being nuclear.42 Though there is public uproar and international scrutiny to
Japan’s use of nuclear energy, Keidanren suggest that nuclear energy is vital to the
country’s economy and to recognize that economic growth depends on stable and
affordable power.43 For example, analysis by the Research Institute of Innovative
Technology for the Earth estimates that energy costs will be reduced by 2.4 trillion
JPY or 20 billion U.S. Dollars (“USD”) per year compared with the present 40%

36. Vazquez supra note 27, at 10.
37. McNeill, supra note 31, at 2.
38. McNeill, supra note 31, at 2.
39. Nuclear Power in Japan, “Japan’s energy situation and international dependence,” supra
note 19.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Nuclear Power in Japan, “Economic impact of shutdowns”, WORLD NUCLEAR
ASSOCIATION, (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/coun
tries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx.
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base-load scenario (renewables being 30%).44 Due to this new projection, many
sources including BP Energy Outlook states that Japanese reactors are expected to
restart over the next five years to reach 60% of their 2010 levels by 2020.45
Following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Disaster, it is clear
that the Cabinet sought to greatly reduce the role of nuclear energy in Japan.
However, Japan’s high consumption rates have created a dilemma that the
Japanese Government now faces. On the one hand, international and domestic
criticism floods news channels in regards to Japan’s hidden agendas among the
ministries, government officials, and Keidanren. On the other hand, Japan must
find energy sources with domestic corporations to stabilize and revive the
country’s economy.

II. Analysis
a. The Practice of Amakudari Contributed to the Disaster
These incidents led to the development of legislation aimed at preventing
such calamity in the future. The country established investigative and research
committees under the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and developed basic
policies relating to preventative and rehabilitation programs.46 Even with Japan’s
investigative and research committees put in place the inadequate regulatory
oversight failed to prevent Fukushima’s large-scale disaster.47 For example, even
before the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, a nuclear fuel production complex
at Tokai released in the environment radioactive particles in what seemed to be an
accident.48 However, government watchdogs stated serious breaches of safety
principles were violated.49 Even with the preventative legislation in place,
management executives, including the executives at TEPCO, systematically
ignored regulatory procedures, failed to report engineering plan changes, and
falsified installation status reports to regulators resulting in Fukushima. 50 TEPCO
and other nuclear production complexes’ conscious disregard towards
implementing preventative measures and government oversight caused a public
outcry because Fukushima’s damages could have been significantly minimized.
44. Nuclear Power in Japan, “Japan’s energy situation and international dependence,” supra
note 19.
45. Id.
46. Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act, NATIONAL LAND AGENCY, (June 1997), http://
www.adrc.asia/documents/law/DisasterCountermeasuresBasicAct.pdf (a provisional translation of the
Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act).
47. Id.
48. Tokaimura Criticality Accident 1999, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/tokaimura-criticality-accident.aspx
(discussing how the accident was deemed human error and serious breaches of safety principles).
49. Kazuaki Nagata, Time to Give Nuke Watchdog Teeth, JAPAN TIMES (June 21, 2011), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/06/21/reference/time-to-give-nuke-watchdog-teeth/.
50. James Acton & Mark Hibbs, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, Why
Fukushima Was Preventable, 1, 24 http://carnegieendowment.org/files/fukushima.pdf (Mar. 2012).
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Following the Fukushima accident, there has been more extensive domestic
and international criticism of the Japanese regulatory system. This criticism
focuses on NISA’s lack of independence from the government and Keidanren.
Japan incorporated regulatory agencies in its Cabinet to prevent the practice of
amakudari,51 defined as “descent from heaven,” an act where senior regulators are
appointed as senior executives in major power plants such as Fukushima Daiichi.
Some may argue that establishing formal independence between Japan’s regulatory
body and major utilities may not result in stronger nuclear oversight unless
Japanese regulators become more assertive. Regulatory deficiencies in Japan are
ultimately rooted in the lack of accountability in Japan’s nuclear culture and a
lower tolerance for challenging authority.
In response to amakudari, the Japanese Cabinet implemented an independent
agency called the Nuclear Safety and Security Agency (later known as NRC), for
separation of nuclear regulation and promotion and to fulfill independence between
the Japanese legislature and Keidanren.52 However, some critics argue that a
formal independence between Japan’s regulatory body and major utilities may not
result in stronger nuclear oversight if Japanese regulators will not become more
assertive.53 Regulatory deficiencies in Japan are ultimately rooted in the lack of
accountability in Japan’s nuclear culture and low tolerance for challenging
authority.
Some nuclear industry executives and officials in the country blamed
bureaucratic and professional stove piping.54 For example, preventative measures
set forth after Isewan Typhoon in 1959,55 and the mitigation research set forth after
Hanshin Earthquake in 199556 should have alerted industry executives and
Japanese officials to reconsider and engage in preventative measures.57 Even
though Japanese legislation provides preventative measures, these measures are
worthless if they are not implemented and mandated properly.

51. INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/amakudari.asp (last visited Oct. 25,
2016).
52. Basic Policy on the Reform of an Organization in charge of Nuclear Safety Regulation,
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/genpatsujiko/pdf/kakugi_en_110815.pdf (separating the nuclear safety
regulation section of the Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry and integrating the function of the Nuclear Safety Commission).
53. Gail Marcus, The Independence of NRA and its Regulatory Activities, http://nukepowertalk.
blogspot.com/2013/05/japans-nuclear-regulation-authority_17.html.
54. Stove piping is a metaphorical term in the context of intelligence information that is
presented without proper conduct and an unwillingness of nuclear professionals to take advice from
experts outside the nuclear field, which then creates a large barrier for implementing stricter standards.
55. Hikeaki Oda, Towards Collaboration Between Typhoon Isewan (Vera) and Hurricane
Katrina, JAPAN WATER FORUM, at 25, http://www.waterforum.jp./jpn/katrina/Typhoon_Isewan.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2016).
56. Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, The Law Library of
Congress, Global Legal Research Center, at 4, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-earthquake/GreatEast-Japan-Earthquake.pdf.
57. Japan: Legal Responses to the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, supra note 55, at 14.
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As one government official states, “there are many tsunami experts in Japan,”
but their findings have “not been taken seriously” by industry and governmental
agencies responsible for making nuclear safety rules.58 This is borne out by the
Japanese commission’s investigation, which noted that no tsunami experts were
involved in drafting the tsunami-related safety clauses in the 2006 guidelines on
seismic safety.59 In a similar vein, Japanese media reports asserted that TEPCO’s
top management ignored warnings from Japanese experts that tsunamis were a
serious safety threat.60 Shareholders expressed their deep anger and sued
TEPCO’s executive for 67.4 billion USD in compensation.61 In the case of
TEPCO, executives and officials were unwilling to exert efforts into disaster
countermeasures, and two of the six nuclear power plants were unable to withstand
the magnitude of the earthquake’s aftermath.62 This was a cause of human error
and oversight empowered by policies that were not applied properly.
Fukushima’s critics have largely focused on NISA’s dependence on the
government.63 To create transparency, the Japanese government created the
independent NRA agency to prevent the practice of amakudari.64 To establish a
strong nuclear safety culture, it is not enough for nuclear plant operators to adopt a
safety culture: The establishment, implementation, and maintenance of a robust
nuclear safety culture are also dependent on a strong and independent regulator.65
Thus, one can conclude that regulatory deficiencies in Japan were rooted in the
lack of accountability in Japan’s nuclear culture and in low tolerance in Japanese
society for challenging authority.
The era of commercial nuclear power generation began nearly a half-century
ago, yet it seems that concerns that an external threat would disrupt the reactors
developed gradually within those years. Japan’s entire industrial and engineering
structures are highly informed of the danger of natural disasters, including seismic
activity.66 Ironically, Japan legislation has not supported these regulations because
the nation has been slow to appreciate the potential danger of some other external
events, especially tsunamis. Or, one could argue that Japan legislation has not
supported these regulations because of Keidanren’s influence. The more
regulation exercised by the Japanese legislation would mean more barriers to
achieve optimal profits from nuclear energy sites.
58. Acton & Hibbs, supra note 49, at 29.
59. Id. at 25.
60. Id. at 23–24.
61. Yoko Kubota, Shareholders to sue Tepco executives for $67 billion, Reuters, http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-tepco-lawsuit-idUSTRE8240RY20120305 (Mar 5, 2012).
62. See Acton & Hibbs, supra note 49, at 23.
63. See Acton & Hibbs, supra note 49, at 23.
64. INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/amakudari.asp (last visited April 3,
2016).
65. Lessons Learned From the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S.
Nuclear Power Plants, “Regulatory Independence” (Oct. 25, 2016) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK253947/.
66. Fukushima Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.world-nuclear.org/infor
mation-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx.
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Currently, while some may argue that NISA had no authority to impose
tsunami-related standards and plant design modification on nuclear power plant
owners, including TEPCO executives, others claim NISA did.67 NISA, as
mentioned earlier in this note, remains an important factor because of the former
influence of Keidanren. Whether or not NISA had the authority in fact may lead to
huge liability issues and a re-structuring of the government branch in charge of
regulating and monitoring nuclear power plants. One view to consider is the
Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident’s
report, which does not limit its criticism to the Fukushima plant’s operator,
TEPCO.68 Instead the Independent Investigation Commission criticizes the
regulators’ reliance on the industry for nuclear intelligence and research, and their
failure in putting in place or enforcing adequate safety standards.69 The
Independent Investigation Commission report further “criticizes the bureaucratic
culture within the main regulatory bodies that prevented the development of
independent technological expertise and was resistant to change.”70 This particular
report demonstrates the high criticism and dissatisfaction for the Japanese
government’s regulatory scheme and its potential for liability. The Nuclear
Compensation Act underestimated the financial liability, and therefore, the
Japanese government provided TEPCO with financial assistance to prevent
insolvency.71 This underestimation resulted in adjustments.

b.Focusing on Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency’s Role
TEPCO and NISA gave insufficient attention to historical evidence of large
earthquakes and tsunamis. NISA, a regulatory agency influenced by the
Keidanren, seemed to have made a series of mistakes that contributed to the
magnitude of the Fukushima disaster. For example, the Disaster Countermeasure
Basic Act, as promulgated by policies develop after the Isewan Typhoon72 and
Hanshin Earthquake,73 requires the collection of data on pre-historical and
historical earthquakes and tsunamis in the region of a nuclear power plant in order

67. Acton & Hibbs supra note 49, at 23–24.
68. Id. at 23.
69. Acton & Hibbs supra note 49, at 23.
70. Id. at 24.
71. Joel Rheuben, Government Liability for Regulatory Failure in the Fukushima Disaster: A
Common Law Comparison, 23 PAC. RIM L & POL’Y J, 113, 115 (2014).
72. See 1959 Super Typhoon Vera: 50-Year Retrospective, RMS SPECIAL REPORT; see also
Hikeaki Oda, Towards Collaboration Between Typhoon Isewan (Vera) and Hurricane Katrina, JAPAN
WATER FORUM, http://www.waterforum.jp./jpn/katrina/Typhoon_Isewan.pdf (describing Isewan and its
consequences).
73. The Great Hanshin Earthquake struck a stretch of the southern part of Hyogo Prefecture on
January 17, 1995. It was rated at a magnitude of 7.3 on the Japan Meteorological Agency scale (6.9 on
the United States Geological Survey scale). Six thousand four hundred people died and 240,956 houses
collapsed. Great Hanshin Earthquake Restoration, KINKI REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BUREAU,
MINISTRY
OF
LAND,
INFRASTRUCTURE
AND
TRANSPORT,
http://www.kkr.mlit.go.jp/en/topics_hanshin. html (last visited Oct. 10, 2016).
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to protect the plant against rare extreme seismic events that may occur.74
Historical data was used in assessing plant safety, but given the historical record of
tsunamis in Japan, NISA should have been much more assertive in pushing
TEPCO to re-structure, define and implement a safe design for tsunami
prevention.75 For instance, a compilation of tsunamis in and around Japan lists
twelve events since the late 15th century of more than 10 meters, six of which had
maximum height of over 20 meters.76 TEPCO did not exercise discretion
thoroughly and NISA did not mandate cautionary measures, ultimately leading to
the damaged reactors and large consequences from Fukushima Daiichi.77
There also appears to have been deficiencies in TEPCO’s tsunami modeling
procedures, which resulted in an insufficient margin of safety at Fukushima
Daiichi. In 2002, for example, the Japan Society of Civil Engineers developed a
detailed methodology for determining the maximum height and impact of a
tsunami on a nuclear power plant.78 The Japan Society of Civil Engineers is an
incorporated association entrusted with the mission to contribute to the
advancement of scientific engineering.79 This advancement to determine the
maximum height and impact of a tsunami should have prompted TEPCO to revise
the preventative design for tsunami prevention at Fukushima Daiichi and to
include design measures to protect against tsunamis that could reach 5.7 meters.80
However, TEPCO did not thoroughly execute safety plans even with the
emergence of new information nor did NISA mandate TEPCO to modify its
systems.
The updated reports released in 2002 for tsunamis would probably have
warned NISA that TEPCO’s tsunami defenses were inadequate.81 Enhanced
defenses might have mitigated the consequences of a larger tsunami than the plant
was designed to withstand, thereby increasing the safety of the plant.82 It should
be noted, however, that TEPCO did not implement the Japan Society of Civil
Engineers methodology in full because the methodology itself was flawed.83 The
methodology focuses exclusively on evaluating “other phenomena [that] are less
important than that of the water level.”84 The failure to consider them at
Fukushima may have given plant operators a false sense of the safety margins.
It also appears TEPCO did not have any suitable tools available to analyze
the full range of effects of a tsunami because Japan’s reports focused on seismic
activity instead of tsunamis. Consequently, the reactors proved to be seismically-

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Acton & Hibbs, supra note 49, at 11.
Acton & Hibbs, supra note 49, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Acton & Hibbs, supra note 49, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Acton & Hibbs, supra note 49, at 13.
Id.
Id.
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protected, but vulnerable to the tsunami.85 But given the prevalence of tsunamis in
Japan, NISA should have developed industry reports to protect from natural events
and maintain international standards. For example, the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission86, provided a full industry report from Severe Accident
Management to Mitigation Features and Protection from Design Basis Natural
Events. These types of reports would have been crucial to the maintenance of
nuclear reactors in Japan and could have lessened the damage of Fukushima.
Since Keidanren and its members tightly controlled the energy market, no
actions were made to prevent or alleviate Fukushima’s damages. It also emerged
in 2008 that TEPCO performed preliminary computer modeling that suggested the
tsunami hazard to the plant had been severely underestimated, which should have
prompted action.87 TEPCO stated that, at the time, it was not convinced of the
simulations’ reliability and intended to pursue them further in collaboration with
the Japan Society of Civil Engineers. This follow-up appears not to have taken
place because executives informed NISA of its results three years later on March 7,
2011.88
A fundamental principle of nuclear safety is the existence of an effective and
independent regulator to set safety rules and ensure compliance. This begins with
government officials who should ensure that operators, including TEPCO, follow
protocol. Japan’s regulators, however, appear to have been inattentive to tsunamis
given the information they had. Consequently, they did not mandate nuclear
power plant redesign and modification.89 The new simulations were based on
actual historical earthquake information; NISA should have followed up with
TEPCO and mandated thorough research as well as assessment of the new
information.90 Had the results been verified, TEPCO might have been able to take
corrective action in time to avert the disaster of March 11, 2011.

III. Proposal
a. Diversify Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority Board for
Transparency
Following the events of Fukushima, critics contend that the current
international nuclear regulatory scheme is inadequate because it allows states, like
Japan, to fail in their own regulatory duties. This section will discuss Japan’s
systemic weaknesses, and how they can prevent or mitigate the harm of natural

85. Fukushima Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.world-nuclear.org/infor
mation-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx.
86. An independent agency of the United States government tasked with protecting public health
related to nuclear energy.
87. Acton & Hibbs, supra note 49, at 10.
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Id. at 13–14.
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disasters. This Article will examine how transparency and international peer
process through the International Atomic Energy Agency may strengthen Japan’s
regulatory system.
Currently, the NRA’s Board consists of five Japanese commissioners.91 It
could be beneficial to diversify the board and incorporate international players who
can draw attention to his or her homeland industry regulations and ultimately
provide a viewpoint removed of any cultural bias and achieve transparency. This
note pinpoints the large consequences of amakudari, ambiguous policies, and a
lack of transparency that greatly contributed to the Great East Japan Earthquake’s
aftermath. The Fukushima disaster and Japan’s bleak nuclear record teach us that
transparency can go a long way in reducing the severity and frequency of nuclear
incidents. It further promotes public knowledge in support of the industry.92
Transparency would create a symbiotic relationship because those who are
concerned about nuclear operational safety and its impact on the environment
would be comforted with periodic updates and information on the operations. One
way to increase transparency is to diversify Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority
with diverse and unbiased committee members, namely international agents
familiar with nuclear energy and environmental policy.
International influence and participation is key to ensuring that the relevant
industry information is properly relayed to the community. International
participation can provide valuable health and safety oversight of both regulators
and plant operators, ensuring that practices like amakudari and operator failed
compliance do not go unnoticed.93 For example, the American Atomic Safety and
Licensing Appeal Board recognized the importance of public participation in
ensuring nuclear safety, stating:
Our own experience . . . teaches that the generalization [that public
participation does not contribute to safety] has no foundation in fact.
Public participation . . . not only can provide valuable assistance to the
adjudicatory process,” but on frequent occasions demonstrably has done
so . . . [and] many of the substantial safety and environmental issues
which have received the scrutiny of licensing boards were raised in the
first instance by the intervener.94
Therefore, international involvement at all stages of nuclear construction and
operation strengthened safety structures by increasing public scrutiny of safety
performance by regulators and operators, in this case, corporate members of

91. Nuclear Regulation Authority, Japan, NUCLEAR REGULATION AUTHORITY (Oct. 26, 2016)
(browse “About NRA,” then click on “NRA Commissioners”) https://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/
outline/02.html.
92. Benz supra note 16, at 869.
93. Benz supra note 16, at 869.
94. In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB183, Docket Nos. 50-458, 50-459, 7 A.E.C. 222, 227–28 (Mar. 12, 1974) (citing Louisiana Power and
Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-125, RAI-73-5 371, 374 n.13 (May 25,
1973)) (footnote omitted).
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Keidanren. This Article suggests that too much autonomy lies within the operator,
advertently Keidanren, because the government officials have not exercised
oversight for the operator to feel any substantial pressure to redesign or apply
safety modifications.
A diversified NRA board is needed to increase transparency and to motivate
nuclear operators to meet their responsibilities and keep with international
standards. This would result in coordination among administration and socially
responsible decisions on safety issues and incentivize a high level of safety
performance by the operator. International involvement and transparency could
also ease the tension between the people and the government. If the board and its
energy policy committed to diversification, including diverse body of
commissioners, there would be less chance of amakudari influence within the
board itself, and consequently unbiased regulatory guidelines for operators to
follow. While Japan may require the use of nuclear energy in the long run, it faces
among others, the challenge of dwindling popular support for the industry at home,
declining population, and the shift of its manufacturing industry.95 A diversified
board and efforts to inform the citizens about the safety and operation of nuclear
facilities could help Japan gain more public support so long as there is regulatory
oversight on plant operators and stricter adherence to safety standards.

b. Encourage Public Hearings in Japan to Foster Transparency
Japan must also introduce inclusive, unbiased, and periodic public hearings
and dialogues without the influence of Keidanren. Public hearings on Japan’s
energy policy choices were held in the summer of 2012, but they struck many as
“staged formalities,” and were met with more derision than mobilization.96 More
emphasis must be given to the communities in a “grassroots” process, encouraging
mobilization through increased information and transparency. Unlike the
Minamata Mercury Pollution case97 where the court’s favor was stacked heavily
for the corporation, public hearings should rather focus on equality empowered
through the right of information.98 Public hearings are meant to inform any
potential stakeholders and the media about facilities, activities, and safety
regulations.99

95. Simon Pollock, Japan’s Narrowing Nuclear Path to a Low-Carbon Future, OUR WORLD,
https:// ourworld.unu.edu/en/japans-narrowing-nuclear-path-to-a-low-carbon-future (Oct. 10, 2015).
96. Richard J. Samuel, In Japan, voters lose interest, THE BOSTON GLOBE https://www.
bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/12/21/podium-japan/IbncmkMCjaNAkecv9OkxIO/story.html.
97. H. Uzawa, The Responsibility of Chisso in the Minamata Issue, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON MINAMATA DISEASE, 335–37 (1989) (Chisso Factory’s wastewater
polluted the fisheries around Minamata since the factory began its operations in 1908. However, the
effects were not known until much later when residents near the factory began displaying eerily similar
and harmful physical effects. This was later known to be mercury poisoning.).
98. See Uzawa, supra note 101.
99. PARTICIPEDIA ONLINE ACADEMIC EDITION, http://participedia.net/en/methods/publichearing (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
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As a result, higher involvement within the community is important for the
public to be involved throughout the entirety of the nuclear power plant
development process without the presence of the company who is under scrutiny,
in this case, those businesses who are members of Keidanren. As it stands, the
legal requirements for public involvement are unclear and leave companies and
local authorities in the dark about how to conduct these hearings, leaving them to
devolve into simple explanatory meetings. Japan should undertake environmental
review similar to that required by the United States’ National Environmental
Policy Act.100 Japan’s hearings should not merely attempt to inform the public of
decisions made without their input, but should open dialogue, which includes
direct interaction between the public and decision-makers. NEPA’s Title I
illustrates the means and ways to enrich the public’s understanding of the
environment and to bolster public knowledge:
Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on —
i.
the environmental impact of the proposed action,
ii.
any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
iii.
alternatives to the proposed action,
iv.
the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
v.
any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.101
Japan’s NSA could follow this model and allow periodic publications
to any major changes in its energy policies and regulations. Though local
and precinct officials may directly respond to the Japanese peoples’
concerns, they do so while providing very few details about the environmental
and regional impact. To overcome the limited information, Japan should follow
NEPA’s guidelines, which could ultimately increase the public’s awareness and
interest in energy reform.
The Boston Globe reports that during the general election post Fukushima,
despite many well-informed and active citizens standing up with innovative ideas
for change, dysfunctions in Japan’s political class overwhelmed reform and many
voters stayed home, leaving those who voted to express a preference for the status
quo ante.102 Here, Keidanren represents the status quo because of their massive

100. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 [As amended through Dec. 31, 2000 http://
www .epw.senate.gov/nepa69.pdf.
101. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, supra note 106 at Title 1, Sec. 102, C, i–v.
102. See Samuel, supra note 95.
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political power and influence on political parties. This is a problem in itself
because the government excludes the people, but does not exclude Keidanren, thus
giving Keidanren the opportunity to present platforms without any challenges.
Following NEPA’s guidelines, Japan’s public hearings should also provide
the public with information on any potentially harmful consequence of normal
operation, abnormal events, and their consequences. This includes emergency
procedures, inspection results, and the probabilities of any accidents. Information
should also include proposals made by both the Japanese government and
Keidanren so that the public is able to understand all spectrums of energy policy
arguments. It seems the Japanese government emphasizes only the benefits in
order to allay fears concerning radioactivity, while downplaying any negatives or
regulatory failings. NSA, can easily remedy this situation by supplying
information on the impact of a new policy, any alternatives to the new policy, and
the short-term and long-term it has and the Japanese people. NSA has consciously
tried to provide annual reports since Fukushima. However, inconsistent follow-ups
and weakened accountability may contribute to the lack of transparency and low
turnout at public hearings because of distrust.
Currently, NSA and the Japanese government take large steps to create
transparency. For example, Japan’s major newspapers consistently update
information on Fukushima including Japan Times’ “Fukushima No. 1” column,
which reports strictly on Fukushima-related news and policies. 103 This is an
important step to ensure that at least some information is available to Japan’s
people to instill trust. This new form of transparency could ultimately reform the
relationship between Keidanren and the government because each party will now
be under public scrutiny and “back door” dialogue would be countered.

IV. Conclusion
Fukushima is a reminder of the calculated risk associated with Japan’s choice
to host nuclear energy sites and emphasizes the importance of implementing a
strict and safe energy policy. By failing to sanction plant operators for countless
safety violations, providing no concrete regulations, and relying on antiquated risk
assessment models, the Japanese government, through NISA, allowed the private
energy industry and members of the Keidanren, to rule itself. If Japan wishes to
continue on a pro-nuclear path, the government must make changes in its political
conduct and in its association with Keidanren. This is essential for Japan’s nuclear
energy policy moving forward and for the safety of Japanese citizens.

103. See FUKUSHIMA NO. 1, THE JAPAN TIMES, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/tag/fukushima-no-1/.

